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NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Rapport
and Erwin: Waging War, Planning Peace: U.S. Noncombat Operations and Major W

Part 4 is a valuable addendum giving
academic, primarily historical, reviews
of military ethics in the Islamic (John
Kelsay), Chinese (Ping-cheung Lo),
and Indian (Torkel Brekke) traditions.
The editors provide summary introductions to all four parts, and they asked
the authors to begin each chapter with
an abstract and to close with a conclusion section preceding a list of references. All three features are helpful.
Aptly titled a “research companion,” this
is a cutting-edge effort by many leading
students of military ethics. I learned major things from every author; and while I
especially admire certain chapters, other
experts are likely to applaud different
contributions most, depending on their
own backgrounds. However, all the
chapters are aimed at advanced scholars
or the highest level of decision makers.
Finally, two critical remarks underscore
scholarly responsibilities. The word
guerrilla is spelled with a single r more
than a score of times—even quoted
materials repeatedly are mangled—in
an otherwise laudable chapter by the
volume’s expert on unconventional
warfare. Second, an author asserts that
the Gulf of Tonkin incident was merely a
matter of erroneous U.S. Navy reporting. While the Navy now judges that the
night “battle” of 4 August 1964 never
took place, no one doubts that the 2
August day engagement of USS Maddox
(DD 731) and three North Vietnamese
P‑4 torpedo boats happened. (There
were eyewitnesses and photographs;
a Vietnamese 12.7 mm machine-gun
round lodged in Maddox’s superstructure; and in 1984 General Vo Nguyen
Giap told former Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara the attack was deliberate.) The lesson for all of us is that, in
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professional ethics, theories are interesting but facts matter, usually decisively.
THOMAS GRASSEY

Waging War, Planning Peace: U.S. Noncombat
Operations and Major Wars, by Aaron Rapport.
Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell Univ. Press,
2015. 266 pages. $79.95.

Innovative, provocative, and compelling,
Aaron Rapport’s Waging War, Planning
Peace offers a distinct perspective on
U.S. failures in postwar stability and
reconstruction operations since 1941.
The disconnect between waging war
and planning peace is the subject of this
intriguing study that applies theories of
national security policy to four historical case studies. A lecturer at the
Department of Politics and International
Studies at the University of Cambridge,
Rapport examines how the ambitious
state-building aims of U.S. presidents
and senior advisers were consistently
undermined by meager planning.
Rapport invokes “construal level theory”
to explain postconflict reconstruction
failures following World War II and
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, arguing that
the Roosevelt and Bush administrations
projected confidence and visionary objectives for peace after the war without
providing the necessary organizational
support. In turn, failures following the
Korean and Vietnam Wars are attributed
to administrations that did not articulate
end-state agendas and instead concentrated on immediate operational and
military gains. The flaw common to the
actors in all four historical studies is that
kinetic aspects of the war were prioritized at the expense of postwar planning.
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The construal level theory consists of
several key components. The more distant our goals, the greater we construe
the long time horizon abstractly. The
more immediate our goals, the greater
we construe the short-term horizon in
detail. Consequently, the desirability
of distant goals can overshadow their
feasibility. National leaders who formulate lofty goals for the distant future
support transformative objectives, while
those who focus on the particulars of
combat operations tend to be preoccupied with a maintenance outlook
that is far more cautious about future
estimations. Proponents of desirability
and transformative strategies for peace
display deductive reasoning based on
preexisting concepts, whereas advocates
of feasibility and maintenance approaches demonstrate inductive thinking
sensitive to context-specific information. Undergirding these processes in
strategic assessments, the construal
level theory presupposes the dynamic
of communication fluency. In other
words, civilian and military leaders’
predispositions toward either desirability or feasibility will determine the
flow of information and whether the
incoming data are accepted or rejected.
Rapport suggests that the semantics of
“postwar” be reformulated. The semantics of “post” makes reconstruction endeavors more of an afterthought, and the
“post” verbiage buys into a sequential
scheme of arranging operations instead
of a fluid model of cooperative interaction. From this descriptive analysis, he
offers a prescriptive remedy to the problem: instead of sequencing or paralleling
phases of the total operation, he suggests
overlapping the coordination of waging
war and planning peace so as to harmonize stabilization considerations with
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kinetic aims. To that end, greater joint
agency collaboration between military
and civilian leaders—both desirability
visionaries and feasibility organizers—
must take place for abstract ends
and concrete means to synergize in
the range of military operations. By
bringing the why of desirability and
the how of feasibility together through
interagency cooperation, U.S. presidents and their senior advisers will be
better equipped to win the peace, and
not simply the war, through a continuum of joint operational planning.
Overall, Rapport’s use of construal
level theory for understanding the gap
between jus in bello and jus post bellum
is persuasive. Readers must decide
whether this particular theory assumes
too great a role in explaining the lack
of correlation between war fighting
and state building and, in the process,
minimizes the cultural, political, and
economic factors that frame the context
and motivate the power brokers of a
given historical period. For scholars and
students, policy makers, and warfighters, Rapport’s interdisciplinary work
in history, international policy, and
psychology is a fascinating study worth
the time and money to read and heed.
EDWARD ERWIN

Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Bruce E. Stanley.
Lincoln, Neb.: Potomac Books, 2015. 238 pages.
$25 (paperback).

Bruce Stanley, a retired Army officer and
professor at the United States Army’s
School of Advanced Military Studies, has
written a detailed and well-documented
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